IWF-
Legal Brief: Placing the Administrative State in Constitutional Context by
Independent Women’s Forum iwf.org, 7/5/16
Federal
administrative agencies today wield vast power over nearly every nook and
cranny of daily life and would have been unrecognizable to the Framers of the
Constitution. n Despite a common misconception that Congress makes the law, the
President enforces the law, and the judiciary adjudicates disputes about the
law, all three of those tasks are often handed over to federal administrative
agencies. To begin, agencies make many more legally enforceable rules than does
Congress. And those same agencies are also given the power to investigate
compliance with and adjudicate disputes about those rules—something our
Constitution would never allow Congress to do. n The administrative state owes
its theoretical underpinnings to the Progressive Era, and in particular, the
progressive view that a limited federal government was no longer suitable to
address the complexities of modern life. The Progressives thought that
government not only needed to be bigger, it also needed to operate differently.
Constitutional checks and balances like separation of powers and political
accountability were discarded in favor of administration. As Hegelian
optimists, the progressives believed that administrators would be disinterested
experts above the political fray. n Of course, the Founders instituted the very
separation of powers eschewed by the Progressives precisely because they feared
the inherent self-interest of man would result in “abuses of government.” n
Given that the administrative state was intentionally created to supersede the
Constitution, it is no surprise that the administrative state creates
constitutional tensions.
First, in
contrast to the Framer’s view that the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers should be separated in three different departments, the administrative
state often consolidates all of the federal government’s powers within a single
entity. n Second, a serious constitutional problem arises when Congress writes
very broad statutes delegating to administrative agencies the authority to
craft law on the most significant political, social, and economic issues of our
time. n Third, federal agencies may act outside the constitutional framework
when they are unaccountable to the President and when they exercise core
judicial functions. n The people need to demand that our government roll back
the administrative state and restore the separation of powers that is essential
to protecting individual liberty.
America’s
administrative state now wields vast power over nearly every aspect of daily
life. From setting up a business to building a home to accessing
contraceptives, it is often an administrative agency that writes, enforces, and
adjudicates the legal standards that govern these activities. This legal brief
explores the problem of governance by administrative agency. First, the brief
highlights how often the legal rules that affect individuals and businesses are
made, not by Congress, but instead by unelected administrators. The brief then
explores the Framers’ views of constitutional structure, and in particular,
their understanding of separation of powers and non-delegation as necessary to
preserving individual liberty. Next, the brief locates the origins of the
administrative state in anti-constitutional progressive thought. For the
Progressives, administration, rather than republicanism, was the key to good
government. Because administrators were to be neutral experts, the Progressives
designed administration to be unaccountable to elected officials. They wanted a
different kind of government, one where republicanism—or governance by elected
representatives—didn’t get in the way of efficiency. Finally, the brief
explains why the administrative state is in significant tension with the
Founders’ Constitution. In particular, the current administrative state
contravenes the limited government envisioned by the Founders by placing all of
the government’s power in one branch, rather than in the three separate
branches. This so-called Fourth Branch of government typically exercises
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and without much oversight by the
elected branches. Further, broad and open-ended statutes passed by Congress
give administrative agencies unheard of discretion to “write” the law.
Practically speaking, the executive exercises little oversight over these
agencies. And the Supreme Court has largely ceded the field when it comes to
judicial review. While the Progressives did not care about upending the
constitutional framework—they viewed the Constitution as a historical
anachronism that must give way to more efficient administration—we should be
wary of arguments and institutions that exchange liberty for efficiency. Though
the vast size of our federal government makes it difficult to envision life
without the administrative state, like the Founders, we should be concerned
when government agencies ordinarily exercise all of the government’s power and
are often practicably unaccountable to the people and their elected
representatives.
Across
America, there is a broad and dangerous misconception about how we are
governed. We believe that Congress makes the law, that the President enforces
the law, and that the judiciary adjudicates disputes about the law. While that
answer might satisfy a high school civics teacher, today, it is wholly inaccurate
in terms of how the government actual operates. Instead, the vast bulk of “law”
in the U.S.—legal rules that can be enforced against businesses and
individuals—is made in the form of regulations by unelected, unaccountable
bureaucrats located across hundreds of administrative agencies. More troubling
still, those same bureaucrats are authorized to enforce compliance and to
adjudicate disputes involving breaches of those regulations. And all of this
occurs with little oversight from the elected branches. Consider the recent
case involving the Little Sisters of the Poor. The Little Sisters of the Poor
is an international ministry of nuns in over 30 countries around the world.
Their mission is to offer the elderly poor of every race and religion a home
where they will be cared for as family until their death. Despite their good
works, the federal government threatened to fine the Little Sisters out of
existence—$75 million per year—unless they violated their deeply held religious
beliefs and assisted in providing contraceptives to employees as required by
the Affordable Care Act. But here’s the catch: nothing in the Affordable Care
Act itself required religious employers to provide contraceptive coverage, much
less forced them to do so in violation of their conscience rights. Those
important decisions were made at the administrative level. The legislative
language enacted by Congress merely provides that certain employers must
provide “preventive care and screenings” for women. Congress left to an agency
the power to define the term. That agency—Health and Human Services
(HHS)—defined “preventive care” to include all of the FDA-approved
contraceptive methods among other treatments and services. HHS did not
initially exempt any religious organizations. Instead, after public pressure,
the agency issued a historically narrow exemption for churches and their
integrated auxiliaries. The Little Sisters did not qualify as an integrated
auxiliary because they have the audacity to serve the poor of any denomination,
not just their own. The Obama Administration then offered them an
“accommodation”—they could notify the government of their religious objection
and allow the government to use the Little Sister’s insurance plans to provide
contraceptive coverage. The Little Sisters refused to participate in the
accommodation because they believed such complicity would still violate their
religious beliefs. Unfortunately, the Little Sisters of the Poor are not
unique.
The full
force of government is often brought to bear against individuals based on an
administrative rule. The Sackett Family is another example. They purchased a
residential lot just north of Priest Lake, Idaho intending to build their dream
home—until the EPA intervened. When the Sacketts graded their lot, the EPA
issued an Administrative Compliance Order, holding the Sacketts in violation of
the Clean Water Act. The EPA ordered the Sacketts to stop building and to
restore their land to its previous condition at considerable expense. If the
Sacketts refused to comply, the agency threatened civil penalties of up to
$75,000 per day. The Sacketts did not believe their subdivision lot to be a
wetland (as required by the relevant regulation) and requested a hearing. EPA
not only denied them a hearing but claimed that the Sacketts were unable to
obtain any review of the Administrative Compliance Order. In EPA’s view the
Sacketts could do one of two things: (1) comply; (2) risk massive penalties.
The Sacketts experienced all this trouble, despite the fact that the statute at
issue—the Clean Water Act—says nothing about wetlands at all. The statutory
text speaks of “waters of the U.S.” It is administrative rule that now extends
that statute to an astounding percentage of land (as opposed to water) in the
United States. In each of these examples, it is far from clear that Congress
would have concurred in the regulatory action. Congress has not legislated
discrimination against religious ministries who serve those outside their
denomination, nor has Congress prohibited building near a wetland. And yet the
Little Sisters of the Poor and the Sackett family faced dramatic legal
consequences—consequences that would have shuttered their doors and prevented
them from building their dream house—because of agency action. The regulations
promulgated by HHS and the EPA have the same effect on ordinary individuals as
would legislation, especially because they come with stringent fines and
penalties. Indeed, rule by administrative agency is the order of our day.
Each
year, agency administrators issue upwards of 3,500 regulations, about one-third
of which substantively affect the way citizens order their affairs. By
contrast, Congress usually enacts fewer than one hundred statutes per year. In
short, as Chief Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court put it, the
administrative state “wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of
daily life.” And there is no end in sight; the Affordable Care Act itself
creates or redefines dozens of agencies. In fact, the federal bureaucracy is so
vast that the government itself has trouble counting the number of agencies.
The Competitive Enterprise Institute notes that various government sources
disagree mightily over the number of federal agencies—ranging from 60 to 430.
Given that federal agencies now wield unmistakable power over “every nook and
cranny of daily life,” it is important to understand how agencies operate and
where they fit within the constitutional framework. To begin, we will look at
the Founders’ constitutional vision, and in particular the separation of powers
and non-delegation principles embodied in the Constitution. We will then look
at how the administrative state developed, and in particular, the Progressive
anti-constitutional theory that gave rise to it. Finally, we will evaluate the
constitutionality of the current administrative state.
The Founders’ Vision The current administrative
state would be a huge surprise to the Founders. They simply did not envision a
federal bureaucracy of the current order. But what about the constitutional
framework? Can it accommodate the administrative state, or are their
significant tensions with the administrative state woven into the fabric of the
Constitution?
This section describes two such tensions that
put the administrative state on tenuous footing: separation of powers and non-delegation.
A. Separation of Powers Central to the Founders’ protection of individual
liberty was a constitutional framework meant to separate government’s powers.
Under the constitutional design, government authority would be exercised by
three co-equal branches of government. The division of powers—legislative,
executive, and judicial—among those branches was intended to protect individual
liberties by making it more difficult to abuse governmental power. By 1787, as
a result of the failure of state governments, there was agreement that even
representative democracy required checks on the concentration of power in any
one branch of government. As James Madison put it, the “accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” The Founders were heavily
influenced by the 18th century political philosopher, Baron de Montesquieu, who
advocated for separate spheres of governmental authority. He believed that the
separation of powers preserves individual liberty by placing checks on each
individual branch. According to Montesquieu, the division of power among the
three branches formed a natural state of “repose or inaction.” This was
critical for individual liberty because it was only when all three branches
acted in concert that the government could curtail individual liberty.
Echoing these views, the Federalist Papers time
and again reinforce the Framers’ commitment to a government of limited,
separated powers. In Federalist 47, James Madison wrote that “no political
truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority
of more enlightened patrons of liberty.” In Federalist 48, James Madison argues
that, while connected, the separate branches of government must remain
distinct. Because “power is of an encroaching nature,” each branch must have a
“constitutional control” or check against the other branches. For Madison, the
consolidation of government power was indefensible: “It is agreed on all sides,
that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be
directly and completely administered by either of the other departments.”
Madison continued his refrain in Federalist 51, in which he argues that
separated powers are “essential to the preservation of liberty.” Madison
worried about “a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department,” and believed that such “usurpations” would be guarded against by separated
powers.
In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments
[state and federal], and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among
distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same
time that each will be controlled by itself. In short, the Founders viewed
separation of powers as necessary for the protection of individual liberty and
critical to the constitutional design. As the late Justice Scalia put it,
“Without a secure structure of separated powers, our Bill of Rights would be
worthless.” B. Non-Delegation Doctrine Not only does the Constitution divide
governmental powers among three separate branches, it vests different powers in
these separate institutions. Article I provides that “all legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Article II provides that
“the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.” Article III specifies that “the judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Because the national
government is a limited one, and authorized to exercise only enumerated
constitutional powers, these Vesting Clauses are thought to grant exclusive
power. Congress is constitutionally authorized to exercise “all legislative
Powers,” the President is authorized to exercise “the executive Power,” and the
federal courts are authorized to exercise “the judicial Power.” But Congress
may not adjudicate cases, nor may the judiciary legislate. Indeed, the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution spelled out the non-delegation principle in detail:
“In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them:
The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or
either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.” That
is, the very design of the Constitution suggests that the powers given to one
branch—executive, legislative, or judicial—must not be exercised by a different
branch. Of course, there’s some play in the joints. The Founders recognized
that it is not always easy to determine, for example, the line between
legislation and enforcement, but clearly sought to keep these spheres separate.
This principle of non-delegation as applied to
legislation can be traced to John Locke’s writing in 1609: The Legislative
cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands, for it being but a
delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to
others. . . . And when the people have said, “We will submit to rules, and be
governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms,” nobody else can say
other men shall make laws for them; nor can they be bound by any laws but such
as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorized to make laws for
them. To summarize briefly, the Framers of the Constitution designed a
government that would be divided into three separate branches. Importantly,
these three separate branches would exercise separate and distinct spheres of
governmental authority. They were not to share or delegate their constitutional
authority. This division was necessary, the Founders believed, to safeguard
individual liberty. Yet the current administrative state looks nothing like
this. Indeed, a wholly new “branch of government” has been created. This
so-called fourth branch of government, the administrative state, often
exercises all three of the separate governmental functions—it legislates,
executes, and adjudicates. Meanwhile, the three constitutional branches of
government often have little, if any, authority over agency action.
The Progressive Background
So, if the Administrative State was not
contemplated by constitutional design, how did we get here? We owe it in large
measure to the Progressives. To be sure, the administrative state exploded
during the New Deal, and later during the Great Society period of the 1960s and
70s, but it owes its theoretical underpinnings to Progressive thought. The
theory underlying the administrative state is important for understanding how
the administrative state fits—or doesn’t fit—within the constitutional
framework. In looking at its roots, the conclusion that the administrative
state was concocted not to make government work better, but rather to make it
work differently is inescapable. For the Progressives, a limited government
stood in the way not only of a vastly expanded federal bureaucracy tasked with
regulating far more conduct than previously imagined, but also of the
Progressive view of the best kind of government. The Progressives believed that
administration was a better mechanism to govern than republicanism. The idea
was that a class of disinterested experts, rather than elected politicians,
should be empowered to decide the pressing issues of the day, because they
would be better able to deal with the complexities of modern life. These administrators,
moreover, would be superior to constitutional governance, because the agencies
would consolidate all three governmental functions within one unit. And, by
design, they would be unaccountable. Modern regulation was to be based on
expertise, and as such freed from political influence.
The Progressive argument for administrative
power and independence was based in Hegelian optimism. This philosophy,
developed by German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, asserted that
humankind was getting nobler and less self-interested. Therefore, Progressives
believed administrative salary and tenure were all that was required to obtain
selfless service.
Administration was to be entirely divorced from
political influence; not because of the very real danger of cronyism, but
instead because administrators would be disinterested experts above the
political fray. Yet the Framers of the Constitution instituted the very
separation of powers eschewed by the Progressives precisely because they feared
the inherent self-interest of man would result in “abuses of government.”
Indeed, in Federalist 6, the Founders make quick work of the idea of human
impartiality, noting that such notions were “far gone in utopian speculations.”
And in Federalist 51, Madison explained that government powers must be
distributed among the several branches because of human flaws: “If angels were
to govern men, neither internal nor external controls on government would be
necessary.”
Make no mistake, the Progressive view of
administration was one they saw as being at odds with the Constitution. The
Progressives thought that limited government might have been fine for the
Eighteenth Century, but that constitutional restrictions on government power
had no place in the modern era with its more complicated problems. In their
view, the Founders lacked foresight and were wrong to shackle future
generations with limited government.
Specifically, constitutional accountability,
separation of powers, and non-delegation principles interfered with their power
to govern. Woodrow Wilson, for example, blamed separation of powers theory for
the inflexibility of national government. He believed that administrators
should be handed all of the government’s authority—the ability to legislate,
enforce, and adjudicate and “freed from the idea of checks and balances.”
Indeed, in 1914, influential Progressive author
Herbert Croly described “a fourth department of the government” that “does not
fit into the traditional classification of governmental powers. It exercises an
authority which is in part executive, in part legislative, and in part
judicial…. It is simply a convenient means of consolidating the divided
activities of the government for certain practical social purposes.” That the
new theory of administration was outside the Constitution did not seriously
trouble the Progressives who viewed “reverence” for the Constitution as
“superstitious.” They were early proponents of a living (changing)
constitution. Woodrow Wilson, for instance, rejected a “Newtonian” view of
constitutionalism that took text and history seriously in favor of a
“Darwinian” perspective that adjusted the meaning of the Constitution to
address new problems.
Why the Administrative State Tests
Constitutional Limits The administrative state today is not rooted in Founding
principles. As one liberal Supreme Court Justice put it, the administrative
state “with its reams of regulations would leave [the Framers] rubbing their
eyes.” But where do the constitutional tensions lie? At the outset, we ought be
concerned about the vast scope of authority exercised by the supposedly limited
federal government. Additionally, much of this governing goes on outside of the
three branches, leading Professor Gary Lawson to argue that “the modern
administrative state openly flouts almost every important structural precept of
the American constitutional order.”
More specifically, Congress often delegates
broad authority to legislate to administrative agencies, in tension with
Article I. Further, those agencies exercise significant authority that is not
under the direct control of the President, in tension with Article II. In a
constitutional trifecta of sorts, the same agencies often exercise the judicial
power, in tension with Article III. And finally, agencies often consolidate
legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the same entity, in tension
with separation of powers principles.
Consolidation
of Governmental Powers
The most
distinctive feature about the modern administrative state is that it
consolidates all three of the constitutional governmental functions into a
single agency. As scholars sympathetic to the modern administrative state
recognize, “Virtually every part of the government Congress has created—the
Department of Agriculture as well as the Securities and Exchange
commission—exercises all three of the governmental functions the Constitution
so carefully allocated among Congress, President, and Court.” Agencies exercise
legislative power by enacting regulations with the force of law; they exercise
executive power by monitoring compliance with those regulations; and they
exercise judicial power by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing
sanctions. Professor Gary Lawson’s description of the powers held by the
Federal Trade Commission is illustrative: The [Federal Trade] Commission
promulgates substantive rules of conduct. The Commission then considers whether
to authorize investigations into whether the Commission’s rules have been
violated. If the Commission authorizes an investigation, the investigation is
conducted by the Commission, which reports its findings to the Commission. If
the Commission thinks that the Commission’s findings warrant an enforcement
action, the Commission issues a complaint. The Commission’s complaint that a
Commission rule has been violated is then prosecuted by the Commission and
adjudicated by the Commission. This Commission adjudication can either take
place before the full Commission or before a semi-autonomous Commission
administrative law judge. If the Commission chooses to adjudicate before an
administrative law judge rather than before the Commission and the decision is
adverse to the Commission, the Commission can appeal to the Commission. If the
Commission ultimately finds a violation, then, and only then, the affected
private party can appeal to an Article III court. But the agency decision, even
before the bona fide Article III tribunal, possesses a very strong presumption
of correctness on matters both of fact and of law. Such a set-up is far from
the framers’ design of a liberty-preserving system of checks and balances.
Article I Under the non-delegation principle
Congress cannot delegate to another branch the
power to make the law. Of course, some exercises of policy discretion fall
within the executive power to administer the law. An executive agency would
have some discretion in administering a statute, but that power is not without
limit. Yet Congress often leaves to agencies the power to promulgate important
and sensitive regulations. And the Court has ceded its oversight role as well.
While there is some reason to think that the Court may be reining in extreme
agency overreach, the Supreme Court has largely abandoned the non-delegation
principle. The Court has been open about its pragmatic rationale; in Mistretta
v. United States, for example, the Court explained that its decision upholding
the controversial independent counsel statute was “driven by a practical understanding
that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate power under broad general directives.” As a result of its view that
the federal government cannot survive without agencies, the Court has upheld
unbelievably broad statutes as consistent with Article I. In Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944), the Court upheld a delegation to fix
commodity prices that in the Price Administrator’s judgment “will be generally
fair and equitable.” In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1943), the Court upheld a granting to the Federal Communications
Commission the authority to write regulations that advanced the “public interest.”
All that the Court typically requires is that Congress lay out an “intelligible
principle.” And it has gone so far as to say that only if “there is an absence
of standards” for guiding the agency, would the delegation be impermissible.
C. Article II Even though administrative
agencies often legislate and adjudicate, they fit most comfortably within the
executive branch. As such, they are tasked with aiding the President in
implementing the law. Yet the President often exercises little (or even no)
power over agency decisions. Some agencies, so-called independent agencies, are
specifically housed outside the executive department, and are thus practicably
independent from presidential oversight. In these agencies, an agency head may
not be removed for policy differences, but only because of gross misconduct.
Even those agencies housed within the Executive Department, like the
Environmental Protection Agency and Health and Human Services, have a
significant degree of independence. As Justice Kagan wrote before being
nominated to the Supreme Court, “no President (or his executive office staff)
could, and presumably none would wish to, supervise so broad a swath of
regulatory activity.” Justice Breyer has similarly opined that “the president
may not have the time or willingness to review [agency] decisions.” President
Truman famously lamented his authority over administrative agencies by
explaining, “I thought I was the president, but when it comes to these
bureaucrats, I can’t do a damn thing.”
D. Article III Administrative agencies often
adjudicate disputes about agency regulations. The Supreme Court has suggested
that such adjudication is constitutional so long as administrative decisions
are reviewable by an Article III appellate court. All this is well and fine,
but appellate review is costly, and since administrative decisions receive
deference, there is a significant question as to whether Article III appellate
review is as demanding as it ought to be. To begin, the predicate facts that
the agency must find to establish a violation are generally subject to
deferential review that require Article III courts to affirm agency factual
determinations if they are supported by “substantial evidence.” The Article III
Court does not get to make up its own mind. Further, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court laid down a highly
deferential standard for reviewing agency regulations. In the absence of a
clear statutory directive, the Court presumes that Congress intended to
delegate its authority to legislate to the agency, and as a result, the federal
courts are required to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute.
This standard leaves broad policy discretion to the agency. Courts are required
to defer to any “permissible construction of the statute” offered by the agency
even if it is not the best reading of the statute. If Congress speaks to the
precise question, that’s the end of the matter. But whether by design or
default, Congress often writes in broad brush and bold strokes, and thus
congressional delegations to agencies are often ambiguous—expressing “a mood
rather than a message.”
Where Congress fails to speak to “the precise
question,” an agency’s interpretation has the full force and effect of law—and
individuals have no choice but to comply.
In short, as the Supreme Court put it, the
Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s “vast and varied federal
bureaucracy” and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our
economic, social, and political activities. Given all this authority and
deference, it’s important to place administrative agencies in the
constitutional framework. So, what did the Framers think of administrative
agencies? The answer is that they didn’t. And what the Constitution does say
puts administrative agencies on very shaky footing indeed. Although the
Progressives may not have worried about stretching the Constitution to achieve
their policy aims, we should care deeply about the limits of the Constitution.
The Founders wisely separated government powers, seeing divided authority as
necessary to preserving individual liberty. By giving unelected administrators
all of that authority at once, and without much practicable oversight, we run
the risk of allowing just the sort of tyranny that concerned our forefathers.
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