Russia in Africa 6-19-24

AFRICA FILE, JUNE 7, 2024: RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC BLITZ; SOMALIA BOOTS ETHIOPIA

Jun 7, 2024 - ISW Press

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War. Africa File, June 7, 2024: Russian Diplomatic Blitz; Somalia Boots Ethiopia Authors: Liam Karr. Data Cutoff: June 7, 2024, at 10 a.m.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Russia. High-level Russian officials are meeting with Russian partners across Africa, seeking to advance the Kremlin’s strategic goals of projecting greater Russian influence to supplant the West and better positioning Russia for prolonged confrontation with the West. The visits are strengthening Russia’s military footprint on the continent, which enables the Kremlin to use its limited resources to threaten NATO’s southern flank and degrade Western influence, advancing the narrative that Russia is a revitalized great power on par with the West. Russia is also attempting to strengthen economic engagement with Africa in various sectors to alleviate the impact of tensions with the West by exploiting new revenue streams and export markets. The Kremlin additionally seeks to gain political allies on the continent, which helps mitigate Western isolation in international forums and advance Russian information narratives.

Somalia. Somalia threatened to expel Ethiopian forces at the end of 2024. The threat will likely degrade the Somali Federal Government’s (SFG) and its international partners’ efforts against al Shabaab whether or not Ethiopia complies. Ethiopia will almost certainly maintain its presence in Somalia, and the SFG is incapable of forcing Ethiopian forces to withdraw, creating a crisis whereby the SFG undermines its legitimacy and exacerbates popular anti-Ethiopian sentiment, which would strengthen al Shabaab. The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces would create even more direct and acute opportunities for al Shabaab to take advantage in affected regions of central and southern Somalia. The move is the latest instance of the SFG giving priority to scuttling Ethiopia’s port deal with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region over the counterinsurgency fight against al Shabaab.

Assessments:

Russia

The following section was published in the June 6 Africa File Special Update. High-level Russian officials are visiting Russian partners across Africa to advance the Kremlin’s strategic goals of projecting greater Russian influence to supplant the West and better position Russia for prolonged confrontation with the West. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Deputy Defense Minister Yunus Bek Yevkurov are separately visiting key Russian partners in Africa. Yevkurov’s trip began on May 31, when he arrived in eastern Libya, and has continued through at least June 3 with stops in Niger and Mali. Lavrov arrived in Guinea on June 3 before traveling to the Republic of the Congo, Burkina Faso, and finishing with Chad on June 5.

The visits are advancing Russian efforts to strengthen its military footprint on the continent.  Yevkurov’s visits and Lavrov’s engagement with Burkina Faso likely intend to strengthen military cooperation in areas where Russian forces are already present. Yevkurov has been the face of Russian military engagement in Africa since the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) began subsuming Wagner Group operations under the MOD-controlled “Africa Corps” after the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.

Yevkurov pledged to enhance the Libyan National Army’s capabilities during his visit. Russia has already significantly reinforced Libya with nearly 1,800 new Africa Corps recruits and thousands of tons of military equipment since March, which CTP has assessed is likely related to Russian efforts to use Libya as a staging ground to reinforce its military deployments in sub-Saharan Africa and secure a naval base on the Libyan coast. Russia also has 1,000–2,000 soldiers operating across Mali, supporting the Malian junta’s fight against al Qaeda–linked and IS-linked insurgents and Tuareg separatist rebels.

The Africa Corps also deployed initial batches of 100 soldiers to each of Burkina Faso and Niger in January and April 2024. The Niger contingent stated its intentions to replace US forces in northern Niger on arrival and entered a base housing US military personnel in the country in May 2024. The United States plans to withdraw all forces from Niger by September 15, and US officials have noted that troops would be leaving behind stationary or bulky items such as hangars, housing units, generators, and other infrastructure. Yevkurov signed a “multi-sectoral cooperation” agreement with Nigerien officials, which is the same terminology Russian media used to describe the agreement that paved the way for the initial Africa Corps deployment. Lavrov also announced that Russia would send more military supplies and instructors to Burkina Faso, fulfilling Africa Corps–affiliated media claims from January that Russia planned to scale up the number of Africa Corps personnel in the country to 300.

Lavrov’s visit to Chad aims to advance the Kremlin’s efforts to grow its relationship with the Chadian regime—including military ties—to establish itself as the primary partner across the entire Sahel and displace the West from the region. Former junta leader and now President Mahamat Deby visited Putin in Moscow in January 2024. The visit marked a reset of Chadian-Russian relations after Russia had supported Chadian rebels via the Wagner Group in previous years. Chad asked for the handful of US troops in the country to leave pending a review of its military agreements with the United States in April.

Putin offered security assistance to help “stabilize” Chad and promised greater political support for Chad in the UN. He also offered to increase humanitarian aid and the number of Chadian students allowed to study in Russia. Chad noted that Lavrov discussed counterterrorism and military cooperation as well as agricultural, educational, and humanitarian support during his visit, in line with these Putin’s initial promises. CTP has previously assessed that aligning with Russia and the Russia-backed Sahelian juntas could pave the way for the Chadian junta to expand its defense and economic ties with Russia to address its own regime security needs and internal pressure to distance itself from the West. However, Chad has also made efforts to balance ties with the West.

The West is increasingly reliant on Chad after losing relationships with the central Sahelian states. Chad hosts France’s largest base on the continent and has received French troops that withdrew from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger between 2021 and 2023. French newspaper Le Monde reported in January 2024 that the United States was considering joint bases with France in Africa—presumably in Chad—as part of plans to adapt its security posture after it withdraws from Niger. Future military cooperation between Chad and Russia would not necessarily exclude continued Chadian cooperation with Western partners, but it has repeatedly undermined such partnerships across the continent by driving a wedge between Western partners and host countries.

Chad’s central location in the Sahel makes it important for all actors in the region, as it serves as a dam against—or potential bridge for—the fighters, weapons, and illicit networks surrounding it. In East Africa, the Sudanese civil war has created what numerous UN officials have labeled one of the worst humanitarian crises since World War II and increased concerns that Salafi-jihadi militants could gain a foothold and strengthen links between various al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates operating in East and West Africa. Russia has exploited the conflict to gain a Red Sea naval station, which it has long sought. In West Africa, al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates are exploiting the withdrawal of Western military support and the Russian-backed military regimes’ callous and unproductive military-first approaches. A reduced Western footprint in Chad would limit Western options to address these threats. Several of the countries where Russia has active forces border Chad, making it an efficient transit zone and logistics hub for the Kremlin.

Russia’s growing military presence in Africa enables the Kremlin to use its limited resources to threaten NATO’s southern flank and degrade Western influence, advancing the narrative that Russia is a revitalized great power. A Russian naval base in Libya would threaten Europe and NATO’s southern flank by helping support Russian activity in the Mediterranean Sea and potentially positioning a standing Russian force able to threaten NATO critical infrastructure with long-range cruise missile strikes from the sea. Russian occupation of the US drone base in northern Niger would create the opportunity for Russia to threaten NATO operations in the Mediterranean Sea with versions of the mass-produced Shahed-136 attack drone. CTP has also previously assessed that the Kremlin will likely use its growing military footprint along key trans-Saharan migrant routes to weaponize migrant flows that risk destabilizing Europe.

Russia has advanced its goals of expanding its military footprint while degrading and denying Western access to the continent by targeting the West’s overreliance on France and security partnerships. Russia has exploited and inflamed widespread anti-colonial sentiment in former French colonies to position itself as a natural alternative for populist juntas looking to distance themselves from the West. Russia has spread its military presence as countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger swap French assistance for Russian assistance. The West also self-admittedly created excessively military-focused counterterrorism objectives as the foundation for its partnerships with several African countries. Western security policies failed to address the underlying drivers of the insurgencies and linked the West to unpopular regimes. These outcomes enabled Russia to easily displace Western influence by offering an equal or greater degree of military support to nascent, populist, and anti-Western authoritarian regimes than the West is willing to provide.

Russia is also attempting to strengthen economic engagement with Africa in various sectors to mitigate the impact of tensions with the West by exploiting new revenue streams and export markets. The Russian delegations explored greater cooperation on infrastructure and natural resource extraction, presumably to increase Russia’s share of those revenue streams and export markets. Lavrov heavily emphasized Russia’s desire to grow economic ties with Chad and specifically highlighted transportation infrastructure projects. He also announced that the Kremlin would send an economic mission to discuss such projects.

Russia has a complicated but solid working relationship with the Guinean junta due to Russia’s significant investment in Guinean mining of bauxite, a mineral that is refined into aluminum. The United States lists bauxite as a critical mineral, which means it has a high risk of supply-chain disruption or significant importance to manufacturing sectors. Russia already has numerous investments in the Congolese energy sector, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects and oil pipeline construction. Lavrov discussed future cooperation on geological exploration, development of mineral reserves, and energy in Chad and Congo. Russian energy sector investors also accompanied Yevkurov to Niger and Mali, which presumably included oil and LNG investors. The Malian and Russian governments signed several cooperation agreements on oil, gas, uranium, and lithium production on March 31.

The Kremlin is also pursuing various aspects of nuclear energy cooperation in Africa to secure additional revenue streams and export markets. Russia has positioned itself as a global leader in the nuclear energy market, including in Africa. This has led to numerous deals on peaceful nuclear technological cooperation and nuclear power plant construction. These deals create multiple revenue and export market opportunities via Russia exporting nuclear energy technology, constructing power plants, and seeking to dominate the uranium market that power plants need to operate.

Nuclear energy was specifically an area of focus in the Sahel. Bloomberg reported shortly after Yevkurov’s visit that Russian state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom is seeking to acquire uranium assets held by French state-controlled company Orano. Lavrov also discussed nuclear energy cooperation with Burkinabe and Chadian officials. Burkina Faso signed an agreement with Rosatom in October 2023 on nuclear cooperation and the construction of a nuclear powerplant. Lavrov also specifically noted that the Chadian president was highly interested in nuclear energy cooperation.

Russia also likely seeks to boost its agricultural exports to Africa to boost revenue. Russia has attempted to capture a larger share of Africa’s wheat market since the late 2010s and has used its invasion of Ukraine to support this effort by targeting Ukrainian grain production and obstructing Ukrainian grain exports.[44] The Kremlin has subsequently tried to frame itself as a benevolent savior by donating some grain to African countries that are struggling with the resulting food insecurity. Lavrov specifically discussed agricultural cooperation with Chad and Congo.

The Kremlin similarly aims to grow arms sales to Africa, which has the added benefit of advertising and boosting Russian military prestige. Lavrov said that Russia would tighten military-technical cooperation with Congo, which has since 2019 involved Russian trainers in Congo helping the Congolese military use, service, and repair Soviet and Russian military hardware, ensuring Congo remains a Russian weapons export market. The countries that Yevkurov toured that have active Russian military deployments have similar military-technical agreements to boost cooperation between Russian and host forces. The Russian defense sector investors also accompanied Yevkurov to Niger and Mali, presumably to explore avenues for further arms and weapons system sales.

Increased Russian economic engagement in Africa provides Russia with new revenue streams and export markets to make the Russian economy more resilient in the face of Western economic retaliation for its invasion of Ukraine. Greater Russian access to African uranium would grow Russia’s control of the global supply market, thereby increasing its leverage with countries reliant on uranium purchases. This strategy has already led to record-high Russian nuclear fuel exports in 2023, despite European efforts to divest from Russian fossil fuel purchases. The Kremlin also mitigates the effects of Western sanctions on critical supply-chain minerals by acquiring lucrative resources in Africa.

Russia also seeks to gain political allies on the continent, which helps mitigate Western isolation in international forums and advance Russian narratives. The Kremlin is attempting to undermine Western influence and create a network of authoritarian and pro-Russian African states that also politically gravitate toward Russia. The London-based Royal United Services Institute published a report in February 2024 highlighting how the Kremlin has internally described its military and economic engagement as a “regime survival package.”  This strategy involves leveraging formal state power and unconventional military units—such as the Africa Corps and Russian intelligence—to offer local elites military support, allyship in international bodies, and information campaigns to boost the elites’ domestic support. Russia increases its influence over target governments and isolates them from the West as a result. This support also undermines democracy more broadly by insulating coup regimes from efforts to encourage a return to civilian rule, which erodes democratic values globally and thereby strengthens the Kremlin’s autocratic narrative.

The Kremlin uses its various partnerships to advance its aims in international bodies. Russian ties contributed to many African states taking neutral stances on punishing Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, helping de facto legitimize Russia’s violations of international law across one of the largest voting blocs in the UN. French media also reported that Lavrov discussed the Libyan crisis with Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who is head of the African Union High-Level Committee on the Crisis in Libya.

Russian information operations spread by officials like Lavrov, Russian-affiliated African media, and social media undermine Western influence and Western values—like democracy—in the “global south” by positing Russia and other revisionist powers as anti-imperial allies against the “exploitative” West. This rhetoric has latched onto preexisting and valid grievances with the West’s approach to engagement with the continent, especially in Francophone Africa, gaining Russia more popular support and allies among populist movements while obscuring Russia’s exploitative objectives. Other revisionist powers, such as Iran, also spread this rhetoric, contributing to the popular and preexisting anti-colonial backlash against the West and its allies on diverse issues ranging from the New Caledonia independence movement to the Israel-Hamas war.

Russia is most clearly creating a pro-Russian bloc that advances all its military, economic, and political aims in Africa in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The AES (l’Alliance des États du Sahel in French) comprises the three pro-Russian juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The juntas announced the alliance shortly after meeting with Yevkurov in September 2023, presumably securing the Kremlin’s blessing. The Kremlin advances all its strategic objectives in Africa through the bloc. It is the primary security partner for the AES due to its strong military ties with all three countries, giving it a substantial military footprint across AES territory. Russia uses this partnership to create export markets for arms sales and has tightened cooperation in other economic sectors to advance its broader economic objectives. Lastly, its “regime security package” protects autocrats and ensures they remain in the Russian political orbit.

The Sahelian juntas initially created the alliance around mutual self-defense but have since expanded the alliance’s aims into a broader effort to politically and economically counterbalance the more nominally democratic and neutral Economic Community of West African States. Malian officials claimed in April that Chad’s now-elected junta indicated interest in joining the bloc. Senior Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leaders also visited Mali and Niger on June 4, as the SAF is finalizing an arms-for-port deal with Russia.[62] The growing engagement between Russia and non-AES regimes as well as between the AES regimes and non-AES regimes highlights the potential for the bloc to expand across the entire Sahel.

The Kremlin is attempting to maximize its objectives and outcomes with relatively low investment, creating limits and vulnerabilities that risk backfiring in the future. Russian trade and investment with Africa pale in comparison to Chinese, EU, and US engagement, although it is shrewdly concentrated in sectors and countries where Russia has identified a competitive advantage. This has made Russia heavily reliant on security engagement with specific regimes, exposing it to the same vulnerabilities that it has exploited to undermine the West in Africa.

CTP has already assessed that Russian security assistance is primarily geared at regime security and will not address the broader insecurity many African partners are facing. These failures will expose it to similar criticisms that partner countries leveled at the West for failing to solve insecurity. Russia also lacks the ability to significantly increase development or military investment in Africa due to its economic constraints, which its invasion of Ukraine has compounded by adding more domestic demands. These constraints will likely limit Russia’s broader appeal and its ability to continue masking its exploitative objectives.

Somalia

Somalia threatened to expel Ethiopian forces at the end of 2024. The threat will likely degrade the SFG’s and its international partners’ efforts against al Shabaab whether or not Ethiopia complies. Somali National Security Adviser Hussein Sheikh Ali said that Somalia will expel Ethiopian forces at the end of 2024 when the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) mandate expires, unless Ethiopia repeals the port deal it signed with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region.

Ethiopia and Somaliland announced at the beginning of January that they had signed a deal granting Ethiopia land in Somaliland for a naval base in return for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. The SFG does not recognize Somaliland’s independence and has repeatedly rejected the port deal as a violation of its sovereignty since neither Ethiopia nor Somaliland consulted the SFG about it. Ali more broadly accused Ethiopia of meddling in internal Somali affairs, presumably also referring to Ethiopian engagement with the de facto autonomous Puntland region, which has had strained ties with the SFG in 2024.  Ali signaled that the SFG would invite the four other ATMIS states to remain in the country in a post-ATMIS framework in 2025.

Ethiopia will almost certainly maintain its presence in Somalia, and the SFG is incapable of forcing Ethiopian forces to withdraw, creating a crisis whereby the SFG undermines its legitimacy and exacerbates popular anti-Ethiopian sentiment. Ethiopia currently maintains more than 4,000 troops in Somalia as part of ATMIS, and thousands of additional Ethiopian soldiers are in the country on a bilateral basis across the regions of central and southern Somalia that border Ethiopia. Ethiopia will almost certainly maintain this presence as it uses these positions to create a buffer zone against al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran several of these buffer points and launched a large-scale attack into Ethiopia in July 2022, underscoring their importance.

 

The SFG is too weak to force Ethiopian forces to withdraw. The Somali National Army (SNA) lacks a coherent presence in many areas where Ethiopian forces operate. Many security forces that do operate in those areas have stronger ties to their clan and regional leaders, many of which have voiced support for retaining Ethiopian troops in the country, further undermining the SFG’s ability to pressure Ethiopia to leave. The SFG similarly demanded that Ethiopia close its consulates in Somaliland and Puntland, which both regions rejected and the SFG has been unable to enforce.

A decrease in SFG legitimacy and a rise in anti-Ethiopian sentiment would strengthen al Shabaab, enabling the group to boost recruitment and likely leading to attack campaigns targeting Ethiopia to take advantage of such momentum.  The SFG’s inability to enforce its request would increase popular anti-Ethiopian sentiment by leading Ethiopia to flagrantly violate the SFG’s sovereignty while highlighting that the SFG is incapable of enforcing its own sovereignty.

 

Somalia’s international partners warned on January 18 that the port deal was already spreading anti-Ethiopian sentiment and that there were “troubling indicators” that al Shabaab was using the agreement to recruit new fighters. CTP previously assessed that al Shabaab would capitalize on the increased anti-Ethiopian sentiment to boost its support, as the group has regularly done throughout its history. This assessment included that one way al Shabaab may do this is by increasing attacks targeting Ethiopian forces in Somalia and potentially inside Ethiopia to feed this narrative of the group as the legitimate defender of Somali sovereignty.

 

The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces would create opportunities for al Shabaab in affected regions of central and southern Somalia. Partner countries would almost certainly be unable to replace a force gap of 10,000 or more soldiers and would also lack the connections in the region that Ethiopian troops have cultivated. These factors would presumably mean that the bulk of backfilling departing Ethiopian forces would hinge on the SNA.

 

Paul D. Williams published a net assessment of the SNA versus al Shabaab’s strength the West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center’s monthly publication in May 2024. He contends that al Shabaab would be slightly militarily stronger than the SNA “because of its significant advantages across the non-material dimensions related to force employment, cohesion, and psychological operations, as well as the sustainability of its forces.” These factors are especially present in areas where Ethiopian forces are present, as years of Ethiopian meddling have exacerbated preexisting clan cleavages and frayed the relationships of regional and state administrations with the SFG. The state administrations’ criticisms of the SFG’s move, specifically its rejection of “unilateral” moves, highlight these tensions. This trend has politicized SNA and regional state forces in these areas, making them especially fractious and prone to infighting, which al Shabaab exploits.

 

Al Shabaab would have opportunities to exploit Somali forces’ lack of cohesion and infighting in affected areas. Al Shabaab would be able to take over forward operating bases that Ethiopian forces vacate without Somali forces assuming responsibility. This situation happened in several areas of central and southern Somalia in 2016, allowing al Shabaab to establish strongholds that it still occupies today. Fragmented Somali forces may also withdraw from some areas, especially in the event of infighting, creating more room for al Shabaab to move in. A similar phenomenon played out in central Somalia in 2024, where fragmented clan forces and federal troops abandoned frontline positions, allowing al Shabaab to recapture some areas.  

The move is the latest instance of the SFG prioritizing the port deal over the counterinsurgency fight against al Shabaab. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohuamud spent the first two months of 2024 rallying international opposition to the deal in bilateral discussions and multilateral forums. These efforts and Mohamud’s promises to amend the Somali constitution sapped his political bandwidth and greatly limited the time he spent on counterinsurgency coalition building compared to 2023. This shortcoming almost certainly contributed to the backsliding that anti–al Shabaab forces have experienced across central Somalia in 2024.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-june-7-2024-russian-diplomatic-blitz-somalia-boots-ethiopia

Norb Leahy, Dunwoody GA Tea Party Leader

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