AFRICA
FILE, JUNE 7, 2024: RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC BLITZ; SOMALIA BOOTS ETHIOPIA
Jun 7, 2024 - ISW Press
Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American
Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute
for the Study of War. Africa File, June 7, 2024: Russian Diplomatic Blitz; Somalia Boots
Ethiopia Authors: Liam Karr. Data Cutoff: June 7, 2024, at 10 a.m.
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major
developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that
undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaways:
Russia. High-level Russian officials are meeting with Russian
partners across Africa, seeking to advance the Kremlin’s strategic goals of
projecting greater Russian influence to supplant the West and better
positioning Russia for prolonged confrontation with the West. The
visits are strengthening Russia’s military footprint on the continent, which
enables the Kremlin to use its limited resources to threaten NATO’s southern
flank and degrade Western influence, advancing the narrative that Russia is a
revitalized great power on par with the West. Russia is also attempting to
strengthen economic engagement with Africa in various sectors to alleviate the
impact of tensions with the West by exploiting new revenue streams and export
markets. The Kremlin additionally seeks to gain political allies on the
continent, which helps mitigate Western isolation in international forums and
advance Russian information narratives.
Somalia. Somalia threatened to expel Ethiopian forces
at the end of 2024. The threat will likely degrade the Somali Federal
Government’s (SFG) and its international partners’ efforts against al Shabaab
whether or not Ethiopia complies. Ethiopia will almost certainly
maintain its presence in Somalia, and the SFG is incapable of forcing Ethiopian
forces to withdraw, creating a crisis whereby the SFG undermines its legitimacy
and exacerbates popular anti-Ethiopian sentiment, which would strengthen al
Shabaab. The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces would create even more direct and
acute opportunities for al Shabaab to take advantage in affected regions of
central and southern Somalia. The move is the latest instance of the SFG giving
priority to scuttling Ethiopia’s port deal with the de facto independent
breakaway Somaliland region over the counterinsurgency fight against al
Shabaab.
Assessments:
Russia
The following section was published in the June 6 Africa File Special
Update. High-level Russian officials are visiting
Russian partners across Africa to advance the Kremlin’s strategic goals of
projecting greater Russian influence to supplant the West and better position
Russia for prolonged confrontation with the West. Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov and Deputy Defense Minister Yunus Bek Yevkurov are
separately visiting key Russian partners in Africa. Yevkurov’s trip began on
May 31, when he arrived in eastern Libya, and has continued through at least
June 3 with stops in Niger and Mali. Lavrov arrived in Guinea on June 3
before traveling to the Republic of the Congo, Burkina Faso, and finishing with
Chad on June 5.
The visits are advancing
Russian efforts to strengthen its military footprint on the continent. Yevkurov’s visits and Lavrov’s engagement with Burkina Faso
likely intend to strengthen military cooperation in areas where Russian forces
are already present. Yevkurov has been the face of Russian military engagement
in Africa since the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) began subsuming Wagner
Group operations under the MOD-controlled “Africa Corps” after the death of
Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.
Yevkurov pledged to enhance
the Libyan National Army’s capabilities during his visit. Russia has
already significantly reinforced Libya with nearly 1,800 new Africa Corps
recruits and thousands of tons of military equipment since March, which CTP has
assessed is likely related to Russian efforts to use Libya as a staging ground
to reinforce its military deployments in sub-Saharan Africa and secure a naval
base on the Libyan coast. Russia also has 1,000–2,000 soldiers operating
across Mali, supporting the Malian junta’s fight against al Qaeda–linked and
IS-linked insurgents and Tuareg separatist rebels.
The Africa Corps also
deployed initial batches of 100 soldiers to each of Burkina Faso and Niger in
January and April 2024. The Niger contingent stated its intentions to replace
US forces in northern Niger on arrival and entered a base housing US military
personnel in the country in May 2024. The United States plans to withdraw
all forces from Niger by September 15, and US officials have noted that troops
would be leaving behind stationary or bulky items such as hangars, housing
units, generators, and other infrastructure. Yevkurov signed a
“multi-sectoral cooperation” agreement with Nigerien officials, which is the
same terminology Russian media used to describe the agreement that paved the
way for the initial Africa Corps deployment. Lavrov also announced that
Russia would send more military supplies and instructors to Burkina Faso,
fulfilling Africa Corps–affiliated media claims from January that Russia
planned to scale up the number of Africa Corps personnel in the country to 300.
Lavrov’s visit
to Chad aims to advance the Kremlin’s efforts to grow its relationship with the
Chadian regime—including military ties—to establish itself as the primary
partner across the entire Sahel and displace the West from the region. Former junta leader and now President Mahamat
Deby visited Putin in Moscow in January 2024. The visit marked a reset of
Chadian-Russian relations after Russia had supported Chadian rebels via the
Wagner Group in previous years. Chad asked for the handful of US troops in
the country to leave pending a review of its military agreements with the
United States in April.
Putin offered security
assistance to help “stabilize” Chad and promised greater political support for
Chad in the UN. He also offered to increase humanitarian aid and the
number of Chadian students allowed to study in Russia. Chad noted that Lavrov
discussed counterterrorism and military cooperation as well as agricultural,
educational, and humanitarian support during his visit, in line with these
Putin’s initial promises. CTP has previously assessed that aligning with
Russia and the Russia-backed Sahelian juntas could pave the way for the Chadian
junta to expand its defense and economic ties with Russia to address its own
regime security needs and internal pressure to distance itself from the
West. However, Chad has also made efforts to balance ties with the West.
The West is increasingly
reliant on Chad after losing relationships with the central Sahelian states.
Chad hosts France’s largest base on the continent and has received French
troops that withdrew from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger between 2021 and 2023. French
newspaper Le Monde reported
in January 2024 that the United States was considering joint bases with France
in Africa—presumably in Chad—as part of plans to adapt its security posture
after it withdraws from Niger. Future military cooperation between Chad
and Russia would not necessarily exclude continued Chadian cooperation with
Western partners, but it has repeatedly undermined such partnerships across the
continent by driving a wedge between Western partners and host countries.
Chad’s central location in
the Sahel makes it important for all actors in the region, as it serves as a
dam against—or potential bridge for—the fighters, weapons, and illicit networks
surrounding it. In East Africa, the Sudanese civil war has created what
numerous UN officials have labeled one of the worst humanitarian crises since
World War II and increased concerns that Salafi-jihadi militants could gain a
foothold and strengthen links between various al Qaeda and Islamic State
affiliates operating in East and West Africa. Russia has exploited the
conflict to gain a Red Sea naval station, which it has long sought. In
West Africa, al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates are exploiting the
withdrawal of Western military support and the Russian-backed military regimes’
callous and unproductive military-first approaches. A reduced Western
footprint in Chad would limit Western options to address these
threats. Several of the countries where Russia has active forces border
Chad, making it an efficient transit zone and logistics hub for the Kremlin.
Russia’s
growing military presence in Africa enables the Kremlin to use its limited
resources to threaten NATO’s southern flank and degrade Western influence,
advancing the narrative that Russia is a revitalized great power. A Russian
naval base in Libya would threaten Europe and NATO’s southern flank by helping
support Russian activity in the Mediterranean Sea and potentially positioning a
standing Russian force able to threaten NATO critical infrastructure with long-range
cruise missile strikes from the sea. Russian occupation of the US drone
base in northern Niger would create the opportunity for Russia to threaten NATO
operations in the Mediterranean Sea with versions of the mass-produced
Shahed-136 attack drone. CTP has also previously assessed that the Kremlin
will likely use its growing military footprint along key trans-Saharan migrant
routes to weaponize migrant flows that risk destabilizing Europe.
Russia has advanced its
goals of expanding its military footprint while degrading and denying Western
access to the continent by targeting the West’s overreliance on France and
security partnerships. Russia has exploited and inflamed widespread anti-colonial
sentiment in former French colonies to position itself as a natural alternative
for populist juntas looking to distance themselves from the West. Russia
has spread its military presence as countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and
Niger swap French assistance for Russian assistance. The West also
self-admittedly created excessively military-focused counterterrorism
objectives as the foundation for its partnerships with several African
countries. Western security policies failed to address the underlying
drivers of the insurgencies and linked the West to unpopular regimes. These
outcomes enabled Russia to easily displace Western influence by offering an
equal or greater degree of military support to nascent, populist, and
anti-Western authoritarian regimes than the West is willing to provide.
Russia is also
attempting to strengthen economic engagement with Africa in various sectors to
mitigate the impact of tensions with the West by exploiting new revenue streams
and export markets. The
Russian delegations explored greater cooperation on infrastructure and natural
resource extraction, presumably to increase Russia’s share of those revenue
streams and export markets. Lavrov heavily emphasized Russia’s desire to grow
economic ties with Chad and specifically highlighted transportation
infrastructure projects. He also announced that the Kremlin would send an
economic mission to discuss such projects.
Russia has a complicated but
solid working relationship with the Guinean junta due to Russia’s significant
investment in Guinean mining of bauxite, a mineral that is refined into
aluminum. The United States lists bauxite as a critical mineral, which means it
has a high risk of supply-chain disruption or significant importance to
manufacturing sectors. Russia already has numerous investments in the
Congolese energy sector, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects and oil
pipeline construction. Lavrov discussed future cooperation on geological
exploration, development of mineral reserves, and energy in Chad and
Congo. Russian energy sector investors also accompanied Yevkurov to Niger
and Mali, which presumably included oil and LNG investors. The Malian and
Russian governments signed several cooperation agreements on oil, gas, uranium,
and lithium production on March 31.
The Kremlin is also pursuing
various aspects of nuclear energy cooperation in Africa to secure additional
revenue streams and export markets. Russia has positioned itself as a global
leader in the nuclear energy market, including in Africa. This has led to
numerous deals on peaceful nuclear technological cooperation and nuclear power
plant construction. These deals create multiple revenue and export market
opportunities via Russia exporting nuclear energy technology, constructing
power plants, and seeking to dominate the uranium market that power plants need
to operate.
Nuclear energy was
specifically an area of focus in the Sahel. Bloomberg reported shortly after
Yevkurov’s visit that Russian state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom is
seeking to acquire uranium assets held by French state-controlled company
Orano. Lavrov also discussed nuclear energy cooperation with Burkinabe and
Chadian officials. Burkina Faso signed an agreement with Rosatom in October
2023 on nuclear cooperation and the construction of a nuclear
powerplant. Lavrov also specifically noted that the Chadian president was
highly interested in nuclear energy cooperation.
Russia also likely seeks to
boost its agricultural exports to Africa to boost revenue. Russia has attempted
to capture a larger share of Africa’s wheat market since the late 2010s and has
used its invasion of Ukraine to support this effort by targeting Ukrainian
grain production and obstructing Ukrainian grain exports.[44] The Kremlin
has subsequently tried to frame itself as a benevolent savior by donating some
grain to African countries that are struggling with the resulting food
insecurity. Lavrov specifically discussed agricultural cooperation with
Chad and Congo.
The Kremlin similarly aims
to grow arms sales to Africa, which has the added benefit of advertising and
boosting Russian military prestige. Lavrov said that Russia would tighten
military-technical cooperation with Congo, which has since 2019 involved Russian
trainers in Congo helping the Congolese military use, service, and repair
Soviet and Russian military hardware, ensuring Congo remains a Russian weapons
export market. The countries that Yevkurov toured that have active Russian
military deployments have similar military-technical agreements to boost
cooperation between Russian and host forces. The Russian defense sector
investors also accompanied Yevkurov to Niger and Mali, presumably to explore
avenues for further arms and weapons system sales.
Increased Russian economic
engagement in Africa provides Russia with new revenue streams and export
markets to make the Russian economy more resilient in the face of Western
economic retaliation for its invasion of Ukraine. Greater Russian access to
African uranium would grow Russia’s control of the global supply market,
thereby increasing its leverage with countries reliant on uranium
purchases. This strategy has already led to record-high Russian nuclear
fuel exports in 2023, despite European efforts to divest from Russian fossil
fuel purchases. The Kremlin also mitigates the effects of Western
sanctions on critical supply-chain minerals by acquiring lucrative resources in
Africa.
Russia also seeks to gain
political allies on the continent, which helps mitigate Western isolation in
international forums and advance Russian narratives. The Kremlin is attempting
to undermine Western influence and create a network of authoritarian and
pro-Russian African states that also politically gravitate toward Russia. The
London-based Royal United Services Institute published a report in February
2024 highlighting how the Kremlin has internally described its military and
economic engagement as a “regime survival package.” This
strategy involves leveraging formal state power and unconventional military
units—such as the Africa Corps and Russian intelligence—to offer local elites military
support, allyship in international bodies, and information campaigns to boost
the elites’ domestic support. Russia increases its influence over target
governments and isolates them from the West as a result. This support also
undermines democracy more broadly by insulating coup regimes from efforts to
encourage a return to civilian rule, which erodes democratic values globally
and thereby strengthens the Kremlin’s autocratic narrative.
The Kremlin uses its various partnerships to advance its aims in
international bodies. Russian ties contributed to many African states taking
neutral stances on punishing Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, helping de
facto legitimize Russia’s violations of international law across one of the
largest voting blocs in the UN. French media also reported that Lavrov
discussed the Libyan crisis with Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who
is head of the African Union High-Level Committee on the Crisis in Libya.
Russian information operations spread by officials like Lavrov,
Russian-affiliated African media, and social media undermine Western influence
and Western values—like democracy—in the “global south” by positing Russia and
other revisionist powers as anti-imperial allies against the “exploitative”
West. This rhetoric has latched onto preexisting and valid grievances with
the West’s approach to engagement with the continent, especially in Francophone
Africa, gaining Russia more popular support and allies among populist movements
while obscuring Russia’s exploitative objectives. Other
revisionist powers, such as Iran, also spread this rhetoric, contributing to
the popular and preexisting anti-colonial backlash against the West and its
allies on diverse issues ranging from the New Caledonia independence movement
to the Israel-Hamas war.
Russia is most clearly
creating a pro-Russian bloc that advances all its military, economic, and
political aims in Africa in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The
AES (l’Alliance des États du Sahel in French) comprises the three pro-Russian
juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The juntas announced the alliance
shortly after meeting with Yevkurov in September 2023, presumably securing the
Kremlin’s blessing. The Kremlin advances all its strategic objectives in
Africa through the bloc. It is the primary security partner for the AES due to
its strong military ties with all three countries, giving it a substantial
military footprint across AES territory. Russia uses this partnership to create
export markets for arms sales and has tightened cooperation in other economic
sectors to advance its broader economic objectives. Lastly, its “regime
security package” protects autocrats and ensures they remain in the Russian
political orbit.
The Sahelian juntas initially created the alliance
around mutual self-defense but have since expanded the alliance’s aims into a
broader effort to politically and economically counterbalance the more
nominally democratic and neutral Economic Community of West African
States. Malian officials claimed in April that Chad’s now-elected junta
indicated interest in joining the bloc. Senior Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
leaders also visited Mali and Niger on June 4, as the SAF is finalizing an
arms-for-port deal with Russia.[62] The growing engagement between Russia
and non-AES regimes as well as between the AES regimes and non-AES regimes
highlights the potential for the bloc to expand across the entire Sahel.
The Kremlin is
attempting to maximize its objectives and outcomes with relatively low
investment, creating limits and vulnerabilities that risk backfiring in the
future. Russian trade
and investment with Africa pale in comparison to Chinese, EU, and US
engagement, although it is shrewdly concentrated in sectors and countries where
Russia has identified a competitive advantage. This has made Russia heavily reliant on
security engagement with specific regimes, exposing it to the same
vulnerabilities that it has exploited to undermine the West in Africa.
CTP has already assessed
that Russian security assistance is primarily geared at regime security and
will not address the broader insecurity many African partners are
facing. These failures will expose it to similar criticisms that partner
countries leveled at the West for failing to solve insecurity. Russia also
lacks the ability to significantly increase development or military investment
in Africa due to its economic constraints, which its invasion of Ukraine has
compounded by adding more domestic demands. These constraints will likely
limit Russia’s broader appeal and its ability to continue masking its
exploitative objectives.
Somalia
Somalia threatened to expel
Ethiopian forces at the end of 2024. The threat will likely degrade the SFG’s
and its international partners’ efforts against al Shabaab whether or not
Ethiopia complies. Somali National Security Adviser Hussein Sheikh Ali said that
Somalia will expel Ethiopian forces at the end of 2024 when the African Union
Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) mandate expires, unless Ethiopia
repeals the port deal it signed with the de facto independent breakaway
Somaliland region.
Ethiopia and Somaliland announced at the beginning of January
that they had signed a deal granting Ethiopia land in Somaliland for a naval
base in return for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. The SFG does not
recognize Somaliland’s independence and has repeatedly rejected the port deal
as a violation of its sovereignty since neither Ethiopia nor Somaliland
consulted the SFG about it. Ali more broadly accused Ethiopia of meddling
in internal Somali affairs, presumably also referring to Ethiopian engagement
with the de facto autonomous Puntland region, which has had strained ties with
the SFG in 2024. Ali signaled that the SFG would invite the four
other ATMIS states to remain in the country in a post-ATMIS framework in 2025.
Ethiopia will almost certainly
maintain its presence in Somalia, and the SFG is incapable of
forcing Ethiopian forces to withdraw, creating a crisis whereby the SFG
undermines its legitimacy and exacerbates popular anti-Ethiopian sentiment. Ethiopia currently
maintains more than 4,000 troops in Somalia as part of ATMIS, and thousands of
additional Ethiopian soldiers are in the country on a bilateral basis across
the regions of central and southern Somalia that border Ethiopia. Ethiopia
will almost certainly maintain this presence as it uses these positions to
create a buffer zone against al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran several of these
buffer points and launched a large-scale attack into Ethiopia in July 2022,
underscoring their importance.
The SFG is too weak to force Ethiopian forces to withdraw. The
Somali National Army (SNA) lacks a coherent presence in many areas where
Ethiopian forces operate. Many security forces that do operate in those areas
have stronger ties to their clan and regional leaders, many of which have
voiced support for retaining Ethiopian troops in the country, further
undermining the SFG’s ability to pressure Ethiopia to leave. The SFG
similarly demanded that Ethiopia close its consulates in Somaliland and Puntland,
which both regions rejected and the SFG has been unable to enforce.
A decrease in SFG legitimacy
and a rise in anti-Ethiopian sentiment would strengthen al Shabaab, enabling
the group to boost recruitment and likely leading to attack campaigns targeting
Ethiopia to take advantage of such momentum. The SFG’s inability to
enforce its request would increase popular anti-Ethiopian sentiment by leading
Ethiopia to flagrantly violate the SFG’s sovereignty while highlighting that
the SFG is incapable of enforcing its own sovereignty.
Somalia’s international
partners warned on January 18 that the port deal was already spreading
anti-Ethiopian sentiment and that there were “troubling indicators” that al
Shabaab was using the agreement to recruit new fighters. CTP previously assessed
that al Shabaab would capitalize on the increased anti-Ethiopian sentiment to
boost its support, as the group has regularly done throughout its
history. This assessment included that one way al Shabaab may do this is
by increasing attacks targeting Ethiopian forces in Somalia and potentially
inside Ethiopia to feed this narrative of the group as the legitimate defender
of Somali sovereignty.
The withdrawal of Ethiopian
forces would create opportunities for al Shabaab in affected regions of central
and southern Somalia. Partner countries would almost certainly be unable to replace a
force gap of 10,000 or more soldiers and would also lack the connections in the
region that Ethiopian troops have cultivated. These factors would presumably
mean that the bulk of backfilling departing Ethiopian forces would hinge on the
SNA.
Paul D. Williams published
a net assessment of the SNA versus al Shabaab’s strength the West Point’s
Combating Terrorism Center’s monthly publication in May 2024. He contends that
al Shabaab would be slightly militarily stronger than the SNA “because of its
significant advantages across the non-material dimensions related to force
employment, cohesion, and psychological operations, as well as the
sustainability of its forces.” These
factors are especially present in areas where Ethiopian forces are present, as
years of Ethiopian meddling have exacerbated preexisting clan cleavages and
frayed the relationships of regional and state administrations with the SFG. The state
administrations’ criticisms of the SFG’s move, specifically its rejection of
“unilateral” moves, highlight these tensions. This trend has politicized SNA
and regional state forces in these areas, making them especially fractious and
prone to infighting, which al Shabaab exploits.
Al Shabaab would have opportunities to exploit Somali forces’
lack of cohesion and infighting in affected areas. Al Shabaab would be able to
take over forward operating bases that Ethiopian forces vacate without Somali
forces assuming responsibility. This situation happened in several areas of
central and southern Somalia in 2016, allowing al Shabaab to establish
strongholds that it still occupies today. Fragmented Somali forces may
also withdraw from some areas, especially in the event of infighting, creating
more room for al Shabaab to move in. A similar phenomenon played out in central
Somalia in 2024, where fragmented clan forces and federal troops abandoned
frontline positions, allowing al Shabaab to recapture some areas.
The move is the latest instance
of the SFG prioritizing the port deal over the counterinsurgency fight against
al Shabaab. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohuamud spent the first two
months of 2024 rallying international opposition to the deal in bilateral
discussions and multilateral forums. These efforts and Mohamud’s promises
to amend the Somali constitution sapped his political bandwidth and greatly
limited the time he spent on counterinsurgency coalition building compared to
2023. This shortcoming almost certainly contributed to the backsliding
that anti–al Shabaab forces have experienced across central Somalia in 2024.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-june-7-2024-russian-diplomatic-blitz-somalia-boots-ethiopia
Norb Leahy, Dunwoody GA Tea Party Leader
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