Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. Executive Orders April 2, 2025
By
the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1601 et seq.)(NEA), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C.
2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that
underlying conditions, including a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade
relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, and U.S. trading
partners’ economic policies that suppress domestic wages and consumption, as
indicated by large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, constitute
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and economy of the
United States. That threat has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States in the domestic economic policies of key trading
partners and structural imbalances in the global trading system. I hereby
declare a national emergency with respect to this threat.
On January 20, 2025, I signed the America First Trade Policy Presidential
Memorandum directing my Administration to investigate the causes of our
country’s large and persistent annual trade deficits in goods, including the
economic and national security implications and risks resulting from such
deficits, and to undertake a review of, and identify, any unfair trade
practices by other countries. On February 13, 2025, I signed a
Presidential Memorandum entitled “Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs,” that directed
further review of our trading partners’ non-reciprocal trading practices, and
noted the relationship between non-reciprocal practices and the trade deficit.
On April 1, 2025, I received the final results of those investigations,
and I am taking action today based on those results.
Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits have led to the hollowing
out of our manufacturing base; inhibited our ability to scale advanced domestic
manufacturing capacity; undermined critical supply chains; and rendered our
defense-industrial base dependent on foreign adversaries. Large and
persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits are caused in substantial part by a
lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships. This situation
is evidenced by disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers that make it
harder for U.S. manufacturers to sell their products in foreign markets.
It is also evidenced by the economic policies of key U.S. trading
partners insofar as they suppress domestic wages and consumption, and thereby
demand for U.S. exports, while artificially increasing the competitiveness of
their goods in global markets. These conditions have given rise to the
national emergency that this order is intended to abate and resolve.
For decades starting in 1934, U.S. trade policy has been organized around the
principle of reciprocity. The Congress directed the President to secure
reduced reciprocal tariff rates from key trading partners first through
bilateral trade agreements and later under the auspices of the global trading
system. Between 1934 and 1945, the executive branch negotiated and signed
32 bilateral reciprocal trade agreements designed to lower tariff rates on a
reciprocal basis. After 1947 through 1994, participating countries
engaged in eight rounds of negotiation, which resulted in the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and seven subsequent tariff reduction
rounds.
However, despite a commitment to the principle of reciprocity, the trading
relationship between the United States and its trading partners has become
highly unbalanced, particularly in recent years. The post-war
international economic system was based upon three incorrect assumptions:
first, that if the United States led the world in liberalizing tariff and
non-tariff barriers the rest of the world would follow; second, that such
liberalization would ultimately result in more economic convergence and increased
domestic consumption among U.S. trading partners converging towards the share
in the United States; and third, that as a result, the United States would not
accrue large and persistent goods trade deficits.
This framework set in motion events, agreements, and commitments that did not
result in reciprocity or generally increase domestic consumption in foreign
economies relative to domestic consumption in the United States. Those
events, in turn, created large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits
as a feature of the global trading system.
Put simply, while World Trade Organization (WTO) Members agreed to bind their
tariff rates on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis, and thereby provide their
best tariff rates to all WTO Members, they did not agree to bind their tariff
rates at similarly low levels or to apply tariff rates on a reciprocal basis.
Consequently, according to the WTO, the United States has among the
lowest simple average MFN tariff rates in the world at 3.3 percent, while many
of our key trading partners like Brazil (11.2 percent), China (7.5 percent),
the European Union (EU) (5 percent), India (17 percent), and Vietnam (9.4
percent) have simple average MFN tariff rates that are significantly higher.
Moreover, these average MFN tariff rates conceal much larger discrepancies
across economies in tariff rates applied to particular products. For
example, the United States imposes a 2.5 percent tariff on passenger vehicle
imports (with internal combustion engines), while the European Union (10
percent), India (70 percent), and China (15 percent) impose much higher duties
on the same product. For network switches and routers, the United States
imposes a 0 percent tariff, but for similar products, India (10 percent) levies
a higher rate. Brazil (18 percent) and Indonesia (30 percent) impose a
higher tariff on ethanol than does the United States (2.5 percent). For
rice in the husk, the U.S. MFN tariff is 2.7 percent (ad valorem equivalent),
while India (80 percent), Malaysia (40 percent), and Turkey (an average of 31
percent) impose higher rates. Apples enter the United States duty-free,
but not so in Turkey (60.3 percent) and India (50 percent).
Similarly, non-tariff barriers also deprive U.S. manufacturers of reciprocal
access to markets around the world. The 2025 National Trade Estimate
Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) details a great number of non-tariff
barriers to U.S. exports around the world on a trading-partner by
trading-partner basis. These barriers include import barriers and
licensing restrictions; customs barriers and shortcomings in trade
facilitation; technical barriers to trade (e.g., unnecessarily trade
restrictive standards, conformity assessment procedures, or technical
regulations); sanitary and phytosanitary measures that unnecessarily restrict
trade without furthering safety objectives; inadequate patent, copyright, trade
secret, and trademark regimes and inadequate enforcement of intellectual
property rights; discriminatory licensing requirements or regulatory standards;
barriers to cross-border data flows and discriminatory practices affecting
trade in digital products; investment barriers; subsidies; anticompetitive
practices; discrimination in favor of domestic state-owned enterprises, and
failures by governments in protecting labor and environment standards; bribery;
and corruption.
Moreover, non-tariff barriers include the domestic economic policies and
practices of our trading partners, including currency practices and value-added
taxes, and their associated market distortions, that suppress domestic
consumption and boost exports to the United States. This lack of
reciprocity is apparent in the fact that the share of consumption to Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States is about 68 percent, but it is much
lower in others like Ireland (27 percent), Singapore (31 percent), China (39
percent), South Korea (49 percent), and Germany (50 percent).
At the same time, efforts by the United States to address these imbalances have
stalled. Trading partners have repeatedly blocked multilateral and
plurilateral solutions, including in the context of new rounds of tariff
negotiations and efforts to discipline non-tariff barriers. At the same
time, with the U.S. economy disproportionately open to imports, U.S. trading
partners have had few incentives to provide reciprocal treatment to U.S.
exports in the context of bilateral trade negotiations.
These structural asymmetries have driven the large and persistent annual U.S.
goods trade deficit. Even for countries with which the United States may
enjoy an occasional bilateral trade surplus, the accumulation of tariff and
non-tariff barriers on U.S. exports may make that surplus smaller than it would
have been without such barriers. Permitting these asymmetries to continue
is not sustainable in today’s economic and geopolitical environment because of
the effect they have on U.S. domestic production. A nation’s ability to
produce domestically is the bedrock of its national and economic security.
Both my first Administration in 2017, and the Biden Administration in 2022,
recognized that increasing domestic manufacturing is critical to U.S. national
security. According to 2023 United Nations data, U.S. manufacturing
output as a share of global manufacturing output was 17.4 percent, down from a
peak in 2001 of 28.4 percent.
Over time, the persistent decline in U.S. manufacturing output has reduced U.S.
manufacturing capacity. The need to maintain robust and resilient
domestic manufacturing capacity is particularly acute in certain advanced
industrial sectors like automobiles, shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, technology
products, machine tools, and basic and fabricated metals, because once
competitors gain sufficient global market share in these sectors, U.S.
production could be permanently weakened. It is also critical to scale
manufacturing capacity in the defense-industrial sector so that we can
manufacture the defense materiel and equipment necessary to protect American
interests at home and abroad.
In fact, because the United States has supplied so much military equipment to
other countries, U.S. stockpiles of military goods are too low to be compatible
with U.S. national defense interests. Furthermore, U.S. defense companies
must develop new, advanced manufacturing technologies across a range of
critical sectors including bio-manufacturing, batteries, and microelectronics.
If the United States wishes to maintain an effective security umbrella to
defend its citizens and homeland, as well as for its allies and partners, it
needs to have a large upstream manufacturing and goods-producing ecosystem to
manufacture these products without undue reliance on imports for key
inputs.
Increased reliance on foreign producers for goods also has compromised U.S.
economic security by rendering U.S. supply chains vulnerable to geopolitical
disruption and supply shocks. In recent years, the vulnerability of the
U.S. economy in this respect was exposed both during the COVID-19 pandemic,
when Americans had difficulty accessing essential products, as well as when the
Houthi rebels later began attacking cargo ships in the Middle East.
The decline of U.S. manufacturing capacity threatens the U.S. economy in other
ways, including through the loss of manufacturing jobs. From 1997 to
2024, the United States lost around 5 million manufacturing jobs and
experienced one of the largest drops in manufacturing employment in history.
Furthermore, many manufacturing job losses were concentrated in specific
geographical areas. In these areas, the loss of manufacturing jobs
contributed to the decline in rates of family formation and to the rise of
other social trends, like the abuse of opioids, that have imposed profound
costs on the U.S. economy.
The future of American competitiveness depends on reversing these trends.
Today, manufacturing represents just 11 percent of U.S. gross domestic
product, yet it accounts for 35 percent of American productivity growth and 60
percent of our exports. Importantly, U.S. manufacturing is the main
engine of innovation in the United States, responsible for 55 percent of all
patents and 70 percent of all research and development (R&D) spending.
The fact that R&D expenditures by U.S. multinational enterprises in
China grew at an average rate of 13.6 percent a year between 2003 and 2017,
while their R&D expenditures in the United States grew by an average of
just 5 percent per year during the same time period, is evidence of the strong
link between manufacturing and innovation. Furthermore, every
manufacturing job spurs 7 to 12 new jobs in other related industries, helping
to build and sustain our economy.
Just as a nation that does not produce manufactured products cannot maintain
the industrial base it needs for national security, neither can a nation long
survive if it cannot produce its own food. Presidential Policy Directive
21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience),
designates food and agriculture as a “critical infrastructure sector” because
it is one of the sectors considered “so vital to the United States that [its]
incapacity or destruction . . . would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.” Furthermore, when I left office, the
United States had a trade surplus in agricultural products, but today, that
surplus has vanished. Eviscerated by a slew of new non-tariff barriers
imposed by our trading partners, it has been replaced by a projected $49
billion annual agricultural trade deficit. For these reasons, I hereby
declare and order:
Section 1. National Emergency. As
President of the United States, my highest duty is ensuring the national and
economic security of the country and its citizens.
I have declared a national emergency arising from conditions reflected in large
and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, which have grown by over 40
percent in the past 5 years alone, reaching $1.2 trillion in 2024. This
trade deficit reflects asymmetries in trade relationships that have contributed
to the atrophy of domestic production capacity, especially that of the U.S.
manufacturing and defense-industrial base. These asymmetries also impact
U.S. producers’ ability to export and, consequentially, their incentive to
produce.
Specifically, such asymmetry includes not only non-reciprocal differences in
tariff rates among foreign trading partners, but also extensive use of
non-tariff barriers by foreign trading partners, which reduce the
competitiveness of U.S. exports while artificially enhancing the
competitiveness of their own goods. These non-tariff barriers include
technical barriers to trade; non-scientific sanitary and phytosanitary rules;
inadequate intellectual property protections; suppressed domestic consumption
(e.g., wage suppression); weak labor, environmental, and other regulatory
standards and protections; and corruption. These non-tariff barriers give
rise to significant imbalances even when the United States and a trading
partner have comparable tariff rates.
The cumulative effect of these imbalances has been the transfer of resources
from domestic producers to foreign firms, reducing opportunities for domestic
manufacturers to expand and, in turn, leading to lost manufacturing jobs,
diminished manufacturing capacity, and an atrophied industrial base, including
in the defense-industrial sector. At the same time, foreign firms are
better positioned to scale production, reinvest in innovation, and compete in
the global economy, to the detriment of U.S. economic and national security.
The absence of sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity in certain critical
and advanced industrial sectors — another outcome of the large and persistent
annual U.S. goods trade deficits — also compromises U.S. economic and national
security by rendering the U.S. economy less resilient to supply chain
disruption. Finally, the large, persistent annual U.S. goods trade
deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial capacity, have compromised
military readiness; this vulnerability can only be redressed through swift
corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into the United States.
Such impact upon military readiness and our national security posture is
especially acute with the recent rise in armed conflicts abroad. I call
upon the public and private sector to make the efforts necessary to strengthen
the international economic position of the United States.
Sec. 2. Reciprocal Tariff Policy. It is
the policy of the United States to rebalance global trade flows by imposing an
additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners except as
otherwise provided herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports
from all trading partners shall start at 10 percent and shortly thereafter, the
additional ad valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated
in Annex
I to
this order at the rates set forth in Annex
I to
this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall apply until such
time as I determine that the underlying conditions described above are
satisfied, resolved, or mitigated.
Sec. 3. Implementation. (a) Except
as otherwise provided in this order, all articles imported into the customs
territory of the United States shall be, consistent with law, subject to an
additional ad valorem rate of duty of 10 percent. Such rates of duty shall
apply with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from
warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on
April 5, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading
and in transit on the final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight
time on April 5, 2025, and entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse
for consumption after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5, 2025, shall
not be subject to such additional duty.
Furthermore, except as otherwise provided in this order, at 12:01 a.m. eastern
daylight time on April 9, 2025, all articles from trading partners enumerated
in Annex
I to
this order imported into the customs territory of the United States shall be,
consistent with law, subject to the country-specific ad valorem rates of duty
specified in Annex
I to
this order. Such rates of duty shall apply with respect to goods entered
for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01
a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a
vessel at the port of loading and in transit on the final mode of transit
before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, and entered for
consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption after 12:01 a.m.
eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, shall not be subject to these
country-specific ad valorem rates of duty set forth in Annex
I to
this order. These country-specific ad valorem rates of duty shall apply
to all articles imported pursuant to the terms of all existing U.S. trade
agreements, except as provided below.
(b)
The following goods as set forth in Annex
II to
this order, consistent with law, shall not be subject to the ad valorem rates
of duty under this order: (i) all articles that are encompassed by 50
U.S.C. 1702(b); (ii) all articles and derivatives of steel and aluminum subject
to the duties imposed pursuant to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 and proclaimed in Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of
Aluminum Into the United States), as amended, Proclamation 9705 of March 8,
2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States), as amended, and
Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020 (Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum
Articles and Derivative Steel Articles Into the United States), as amended,
Proclamation 10895 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the
United States), and Proclamation 10896 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports
of Steel into the United States); (iii) all automobiles and automotive parts
subject to the additional duties imposed pursuant to section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, and proclaimed in Proclamation 10908 of
March 26, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the
United States); (iv) other products enumerated in Annex
II to
this order, including copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber articles,
certain critical minerals, and energy and energy products; (v) all articles
from a trading partner subject to the rates set forth in Column 2 of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS); and (vi) all articles
that may become subject to duties pursuant to future actions under section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
(c)
The rates of duty established by this order are in addition to any other
duties, fees, taxes, exactions, or charges applicable to such imported
articles, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section
below.
(d)
With respect to articles from Canada, I have imposed additional duties on
certain goods to address a national emergency resulting from the flow of
illicit drugs across our northern border pursuant to Executive Order 14193 of
February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across
Our Northern Border), as amended by Executive Order 14197 of February 3, 2025
(Progress on the Situation at Our Northern Border), and Executive Order 14231
of March 2, 2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs
Across Our Northern Border). With respect to articles from Mexico, I have
imposed additional duties on certain goods to address a national emergency
resulting from the flow of illicit drugs and illegal migration across our
southern border pursuant to Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing
Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border), as amended by
Executive Order 14198 of February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our
Southern Border), and Executive Order 14227 of March 2, 2025 (Amendment to
Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border). As a result of
these border emergency tariff actions, all goods of Canada or Mexico under the
terms of general note 11 to the HTSUS, including any treatment set forth in
subchapter XXIII of chapter 98 and subchapter XXII of chapter 99 of the HTSUS,
as related to the Agreement between the United States of America, United
Mexican States, and Canada (USMCA), continue to be eligible to enter the U.S.
market under these preferential terms. However, all goods of Canada or
Mexico that do not qualify as originating under USMCA are presently subject to
additional ad valorem duties of 25 percent, with energy or energy resources and
potash imported from Canada and not qualifying as originating under USMCA
presently subject to the lower additional ad valorem duty of 10 percent.
(e)
Any ad valorem rate of duty on articles imported from Canada or Mexico
under the terms of this order shall not apply in addition to the ad valorem
rate of duty specified by the existing orders described in subsection (d) of
this section. If such orders identified in subsection (d) of this section
are terminated or suspended, all items of Canada and Mexico that qualify as
originating under USMCA shall not be subject to an additional ad valorem rate
of duty, while articles not qualifying as originating under USMCA shall be
subject to an ad valorem rate of duty of 12 percent. However, these ad
valorem rates of duty on articles imported from Canada and Mexico shall not
apply to energy or energy resources, to potash, or to an article eligible for
duty-free treatment under USMCA that is a part or component of an article
substantially finished in the United States.
(f)
More generally, the ad valorem rates of duty set forth in this order
shall apply only to the non-U.S. content of a subject article, provided at
least 20 percent of the value of the subject article is U.S. originating.
For the purposes of this subsection, “U.S. content” refers to the value
of an article attributable to the components produced entirely, or
substantially transformed in, the United States. U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), to the extent permitted by law, is authorized to require the
collection of such information and documentation regarding an imported article,
including with the entry filing, as is necessary to enable CBP to ascertain and
verify the value of the U.S. content of the article, as well as to ascertain
and verify whether an article is substantially finished in the United
States.
(g)
Subject articles, except those eligible for admission under “domestic
status” as defined in 19 CFR 146.43, which are subject to the duty specified in
section 2 of this order and are admitted into a foreign trade zone on or after
12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, must be admitted as
“privileged foreign status” as defined in 19 CFR 146.41.
(h)
Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(A)-(B) shall
remain available for the articles described in subsection (a) of this section.
Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall remain
available for the articles described in subsection (a) of this section until
notification by the Secretary of Commerce to the President that adequate
systems are in place to fully and expeditiously process and collect duty
revenue applicable pursuant to this subsection for articles otherwise eligible
for de minimis treatment. After such notification, duty-free de minimis
treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall not be available for the articles
described in subsection (a) of this section.
(i)
The Executive Order of April 2, 2025 (Further Amendment to Duties
Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China
as Applied to Low-Value Imports), regarding low-value imports from China is not
affected by this order, and all duties and fees with respect to covered
articles shall be collected as required and detailed therein.
(j)
To reduce the risk of transshipment and evasion, all ad valorem rates of
duty imposed by this order or any successor orders with respect to articles of
China shall apply equally to articles of both the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region.
(k)
In order to establish the duty rates described in this order, the HTSUS
is modified as
set forth in the Annexes to this order. These modifications shall enter
into effect on the dates set forth in the Annexes to this order.
(l)
Unless specifically noted herein, any prior Presidential Proclamation,
Executive Order, or other Presidential directive or guidance related to trade
with foreign trading partners that is inconsistent with the direction in this
order is hereby terminated, suspended, or modified to the extent necessary to
give full effect to this order.
Sec. 4. Modification Authority. (a)
The Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, shall recommend to me additional action,
if necessary, if this action is not effective in resolving the emergency
conditions described above, including the increase in the overall trade deficit
or the recent expansion of non-reciprocal trade arrangements by U.S. trading
partners in a manner that threatens the economic and national security
interests of the United States.
(b)
Should any trading partner retaliate against the United States in
response to this action through import duties on U.S. exports or other
measures, I may further modify the HTSUS to increase or expand in scope the
duties imposed under this order to ensure the efficacy of this action.
(c)
Should any trading partner take significant steps to remedy
non-reciprocal trade arrangements and align sufficiently with the United States
on economic and national security matters, I may further modify the HTSUS to
decrease or limit in scope the duties imposed under this order.
(d)
Should U.S. manufacturing capacity and output continue to worsen, I may
further modify the HTSUS to increase duties under this order.
Sec. 5. Implementation Authority. The
Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, and the Chair of the International
Trade Commission are hereby authorized to employ all powers granted to the
President by IEEPA as may be necessary to implement this order. Each
executive department and agency shall take all appropriate measures within its
authority to implement this order.
Sec. 6. Reporting Requirements. The
United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the
Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, is hereby authorized to submit
recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared
in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c))
and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).
Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a)
Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i)
the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the
head thereof; or
(ii)
the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b)
This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and
subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c)
This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against
the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers,
employees, or agents, or any other person.
DONALD J. TRUMP
THE WHITE HOUSE, April 2, 2025.
Comments
The Global Free Trade experiment has resulted in Trade Imbalances. Economies across the world are National. Countries must attempt to produce what they consume. Trump’s plan to return to Reciprocal Trade is required. Tariffs are taxes on imports and have been used to give economic incentives to countries to produce what they consume. The US began to outsource manufacturing in the 1990s and needs to return manufacturing back to the US to provide better paying jobs tp save its Middle Class. The US has provided Military Foreign Aid to allies for over 100 years and now needs to pay down its National Debt. Increasing US Import Tariffs will accomplish this. The US also needs to restore its manufacturing capability to deter aggression. At the same time, the US needs to lower spending from $7 trillion to $5 trillion and needs to automate government work. This requires upgrading government computers to develop share databases. Our National Debt is approaching $37 trillion and interest on the debt is over $1 trillion per year. This interest needs to be reduced.
Norb Leahy, Dunwoody GA Tea Party Leader
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