Public opinion polling from 2024 and 2025 indicates that most Russians would prefer peace negotiations to continued fighting in Ukraine, but that public preference is unlikely to force a policy change from President Vladimir Putin. A highly repressive environment with severe censorship prevents large-scale organized dissent. As of October 2025, signs of resistance include muted protests, anti-war sentiment among certain demographics, and actions by anti-regime partisan groups.
Public
opinion and sentiment
Desire
for peace: Independent polls show that many Russians are experiencing war
fatigue and desire peace. A poll conducted by the Levada Center found that 63%
of Russians favored peace talks in July 2025. A February 2025 poll by the
Chronicles project reported that over half of Russians believed the war had a
negative effect on their lives.
Approval of actions: Despite the desire for peace, the same polls show that many Russians leave policy decisions entirely to the authorities, believing "they know better". A July 2025 Levada Center poll also noted that 78% of Russians approved of the military's actions in Ukraine.
Demographic
differences: Women consistently express more pessimistic views about the
war's consequences than men. A majority of younger Russians have also
consistently shown less support for Putin and his policies, a trend predating
the full-scale invasion.
Contradictory
messaging: The Kremlin attempts to balance its nationalist, pro-war
rhetoric with reassurances of domestic stability. This can undermine the
perception of a dire external threat that would require greater personal
sacrifice, like a mass mobilization.
Organized dissent
Severe
repression: Russian authorities have systematically suppressed anti-war
sentiment with strict censorship laws that punish "fake news" about
the military with up to 15 years in prison. Critics of the war are labeled as
traitors, and political opposition has been decimated, with many prominent
figures either in exile or imprisoned.
Exiled
opposition: Exiled opposition leaders, including Yulia Navalnaya and
Vladimir Kara-Murza, have continued to organize anti-war demonstrations abroad.
For example, a large rally was held in Berlin in March 2025.
Partisan
activity: Armed partisan groups operating within Russia have engaged in
sabotage against the war effort. For instance, in October 2025, a pro-Ukrainian
group claimed responsibility for a strike that disrupted command and control
infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast.
Civil society groups: The political party Yabloko, which uses a peace symbol in its campaigns, has used local and regional elections as a legal avenue to express anti-war sentiments and call for a ceasefire. However, the Kremlin is attempting to eliminate this option by challenging their ability to run in future elections.
Evidence
of continued pro-war policy
While
public resistance and war fatigue exist, Russian authorities show little sign
of ending the war.
Continued
military action: Russian forces continue offensive operations on the
battlefield, and Moscow has reportedly formed a strategic reserve from new
recruits to sustain its campaign.
Demands for capitulation: The Kremlin continues to set peace terms that are unacceptable to Ukraine and amount to its full capitulation.
Information
control: Russia has implemented a pilot program for a "digital
ruble" in occupied territories, giving the Kremlin greater control over
finances and potentially using access to funds as a tool for political control.
Resettlement in occupied areas: Russia is trying to change the demographics in occupied Ukraine by resettling Russians there and seizing property from those who fled or died during the invasion.
As of late 2025, evidence of Russian resistance to ending the war in Ukraine is primarily confined to small-scale, decentralized, and often high-risk acts of protest. Due to severe government repression and war censorship laws, these actions face harsh crackdowns, and they do not currently represent a large, organized, or widespread threat to the Kremlin's policies.
Public
protests and dissent
Targeted
protests: Despite the risks, some Russians engage in protest. In February
2025, to mark the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion, protesters in
Moscow left flowers at monuments in a tightly controlled and limited act of
public defiance.
Musical defiance: Rare and poignant acts of resistance have occurred, particularly among younger people. In October 2025, a student street musician in St. Petersburg was arrested after leading a crowd in singing an anti-war song. The song, "Swan Lake Cooperative," was banned earlier in the year as "extremist".
Anti-war
opposition groups
Silenced
dissent: Organized anti-war opposition within Russia has been effectively
suppressed by the Kremlin's war censorship laws, which prohibit criticizing the
military or the invasion.
Continued campaigns from exile: Russian opposition leaders living in exile, such as Yulia Navalnaya, Vladimir Kara-Murza, and Ilya Yashin, continue to call for resistance. They have organized larger protests in European cities, such as the March 2025 rally in Berlin.
Soldiers'
resistance
Desertion: Reports
indicate that the number of Russians deserting the military has continued to
increase in 2025. An organization that helps Russians flee conscription and the
military, Idite Lesom, claims to have helped tens of thousands of Russians
avoid mobilization since the war began.
Soldiers'
wives: An organization known as "The Way Home" includes the
wives of mobilized soldiers who have protested to demand their husbands' return
from the front. The Kremlin has attempted to silence this group, but some
members continue to speak out.
Limitations of resistance
High support for state narrative: Despite isolated acts of resistance, polling data indicates that a majority of Russians either support the war or accept the official government narrative. An August 2025 Levada Center poll, for example, found that 78% of Russians supported the military's actions in Ukraine.
Economic
factors: While polls have shown increasing public discontent with the
war's negative economic impact, this dissatisfaction does not necessarily
translate into active opposition to the war itself.
Fear and conformity: Repressive state measures have fostered a climate of fear, leading many Russians who may be against the war to conform publicly rather than risk severe penalties.
https://www.google.com/search?q=evidence+of+russian+resistance+to+end+the+ukraine+war+2025
Norb Leahy, Dunwoody GA Tea Party Leader
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