Friday, May 23, 2014

Georgia Voting Machine Problems

This is regarding GEORGIA, but all states need to see this!

VoterGA Supporters,

We monitored three county elections offices during the May 20, 2014 primary last night. As some of you know from my previous reports, many counties now upload their results to a site named Clarity Elections, which is a product of Tampa based, SOE Software, a subsidiary of the Spanish owned conglomerate, SCYTL. The URL web address indicates the actual web page location for the site which is disguised or branded to look like a Georgia

Secretary of State (SOS) web page. Note that the browser address bar identifies the source location as Clarity Elections, which is not part of the Georgia SOS web site as shown below:

COUNTY UPLOAD VULNERABILITIES:

The county uploads typically take place at least three times during the evening. They are done with a direct connection from the county server to SOE Software in smaller counties. Larger counties tend to use a flash drive to transfer results from the county server to a communications server for upload to SOE. The flash drive is repeatedly loaded with results from the county server, transferred to a communications server for upload, electronically cleared by SOE Software and then re-inserted into the county server to repeat the next upload process. As you can also see by a careful reading of Secretary Kemp's response, there is no audit procedure that could help detect and prevent a remote hack from SOE into the county servers during these uploads. Tampering with county election results could occur either through the direct connection or by updating the flash drive with malicious software when it is cleared by SOE prior to re-insertion into the county servers. None of the counties we observed could identify adequate protection against these types of remote intrusions. Furthermore, there is no procedure or law for counties to publish or verify results prior to uploading and most do not despite SOS claims to the contrary. Two of the three counties we observed did not verify results prior to uploading.  The third claimed that there was a process but refused to allow any candidate or citizen to observe the Election Night activities. It is interesting to note that this county, which continues to perform Election Night procedures in secrecy, is also a county that has incurred some of the most significant electronic vote count problems that have ever occurred in Georgia.

VOTING MACHINE VULNERABILITIES:

For the reasons above we recommended that candidates gather at least some of their results from the printed tapes of each machine tape in each precinct.

These machine tapes are typically posted inside a glass door or window at the precinct and are visible from the outside. An observer who arrives at the precinct before 7pm can also watch the accumulation process provided that the observer does not touch any equipment or media.  This takes about an hour and either approach allows a candidate or concerned citizen to verify precinct reported vote totals against the precinct totals reported by their respective counties. However, this does not assure that the voting machines counted the votes correctly since they have no way to be independently audited. Contrary to SOS claims, no form of pre-election testing can guarantee that the voting machines will count accurately on Election Day. The many VoterGA supporters who have seen my presentation know that there are several ways to program the machines to count differently on Election Day than during testing. The only way to ensure voting machine accuracy is thorough precinct level Election Night auditing and that is impossible with the current equipment.

Source: Garland Favorito, Voterga.org 404 664-4044 forwarded by Victoria Baer email, May 21, 2014 From: Garland Favorito [mailto:garlandf@msn.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 21, 2014 6:56 PM Subject: County Election  Proceedure Vulnerabilities

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