2015 may go down as the year that
Congress gave up some of its most important legislative powers. Or, at least,
the year it was confirmed that Congress’ powers are not what they used to be.
Take President Barack Obama’s
executive amnesty granting legal status to millions of illegal immigrants with
children who were born in the U.S.
In 2014, Congressional Republicans
campaigned on the issue and promised to roll it back if they were granted
majorities in the House and Senate. They won.
And Homeland Security funding was
even separated out from the omnibus so that very fight could be had in 2015
with the new majorities.
But when push came to shove,
Congress relented, and gave funding for Homeland Security without any strings
attached, thus granting the taxpayer dollars to carry out the amnesty program.
Then there was the Iran nuclear
deal. Members of Congress say they now oppose it. But why didn’t they wait for
Obama to reveal the deal before they passed H.R.
1191? That legislation by Sen. Bob
Corker (R-Tenn.) was passed in May and gave Obama all of the authority he
needed to lift sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program.
The law provides that “any measure
of statutory sanctions relief by the United States pursuant to an agreement
[with Iran]… may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for
such action, if, following the period for review provided… there is not enacted
any such joint resolution” by Congress disapproving of the deal.
In other words, the Iran nuclear
deal was preapproved before anyone could read it. And Congress wanted to
pretend that it would be voting against it after it was unveiled. Give me a
break.
Naturally, Obama promised to veto
any such resolution of disapproval, and 150
House Democrats signaled in May
that they will be voting to sustain such a veto.
The Senate should have treated the
nuclear deal as a treaty and subjected it to that level of scrutiny, including
the constitutionally-requisite two-thirds majority of present senators to ratify
it. Instead, Congress ceded the Senate’s treaty power.
Apologists will say this is nothing
new. And indeed it isn’t. Presidents have been entering into legally-binding
executive agreements with foreign nations for decades.
In United States v. Belmont (1937),
the Supreme Court found that international compacts – even ones that are not
treaties, including executive agreements, and thus were not approved by
two-thirds of the Senate – were the supreme law of the land.
Wrote Justice George Sutherland in
the court’s majority opinion: “While this rule in respect of treaties is
established by the express language of clause 2, article 6, of the
Constitution, the same rule would result in the case of all international
compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete power over
international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be
subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states.”
The question was whether an
executive agreement with the Soviet Union that was never ratified by the Senate
trumped state law, invoking the supremacy clause. In that case it did. That was
the decision that obliterated the treaty clause. Now Senate ratification is
optional.
Next there was legislation granting
trade authority to Obama to negotiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a global
trade agreement between the U.S. and Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.
Now don’t tell me trade deals are
not treaties, too. In 1795, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay negotiated a
commercial treaty with Great Britain, “The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and
Navigation, Between His Britannic Majesty and The United States of America.” It
was put to the Senate for ratification by a two-thirds vote, which eventually
came on June 24, 1795.
Yet, with the trade authority
legislation, Obama gets to submit the final agreement to Congress for approval
by a simple majority of both chambers, instead of the two-thirds treaty
ratification vote in the Senate.
Of course, like executive
agreements, this sort of executive-congressional agreement is nothing new,
thanks to the Trade Act of 1974, which created an entirely new method of
enacting trade accords. Now, the House and Senate authorize the President to
negotiate trade deals, and then they are adopted by the House and Senate on an
expedited basis — so-called fast track legislation.
Finally, there is the so-called Dotcom
(Domain Openness Through Continued Oversight Matters) Act that the House voted on
June 23 to pass.
The framers of the legislation
pretend that it will “prohibit the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration from relinquishing responsibility over the Internet domain name
system…”
That is, “Until the date that is 30
legislative days after the submission to Congress of [a] report” by NTIA making
certain certifications that everything will be okay with the transition.
In other words, the very bill that
purports to “prohibit” turning over the administration of vital Internet
functions — governing the assignment of domain names and Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses — actually authorizes their giveaway to the international community.
All the Obama administration would have to do is turn in a book report to
complete the transition.
Again, the legislation is put forth
as the means to stop an Obama agenda item, in this case the Internet giveaway,
but actually sows the seeds for it being passed. How deceptive. How cynical.
And all this after Republicans ran
for majorities in the House and Senate on the promise of restoring the
legislative branch’s primacy. Are they kidding, or what? We need Congress to
assert its constitutionally-enumerated powers under Article I and Article II
now more than ever. It’s not just a campaign talking point; it actually needs
to be done to stop this administration.
Robert
Romano is the senior editor of Americans for Limited Government.
http://netrightdaily.com/2015/07/2015-the-year-congress-gave-up/
http://netrightdaily.com/2015/07/2015-the-year-congress-gave-up/
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